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How do enterprises respond to a managerial 
accounting performance measure mandated by the 
State? 
 
 
 
 
Abstract 
 
 
We study the application of Economic Value Added (EVA®) by Chinese state-
owned enterprises (SOEs) following a regulatory requirement to deploy the measure. 
Our theoretical framing engages conceptual elements of institutional work and public 
accountability research to consider why key actors vary in their responses to the 
mandated application of EVA®.  Our data derives from thirty interviews with 
managers in three SOEs and their oversight body (the State-owned Assets Supervision 
and Administration Commission of the State Council). We identify two relevant 
dimensions associated with managers: ‘accounting centricity’ and ‘institutional 
potential’ and report that they drive the authenticity of actors’ responses in the 
absence of enforcement of the mandated measure.  When accounting centricity and 
institutional potential align to the dictates of the higher implementing body, 
accountability remains high notwithstanding the absence of enforcement.  When these 
two factors do not align, accountability fails even when politicization is high and 
formal accountability claims are high. Where the two factors are partially present, the 
accountability response is mixed. Our study contributes to a refinement of the 
perspective advanced by prior investigations of institutionally sanctioned roll outs of 
accounting systems highlighting in particular, the role of human agency in explaining 
actor responses. 
 
Keywords: Economic Value Added; Managerial Accounting Regulation; State 
Owned Enterprises  
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1. Introduction 
Since the privatization initiatives advanced by the Chinese government in the 
late 1970’s, researchers have investigated the implementation of different managerial 
accounting controls in Chinese organizations (Duh et al. 2008), including 
performance evaluation systems (Du et al. 2012), capital resource allocation 
techniques (Chen and Yuan 2004) and audit quality (Huang et al. 2014; Ke et al. 
2014). Commentators have noted that whilst state-owned enterprises have benefitted 
from favoritism from local governments, light touch regulation and cheap bank 
financing, they have delivered ‘less bang for their buck’ 1 
   
We study the application of Economic Value Added (EVA®) by Chinese state-
owned enterprises (SOEs) following a regulatory requirement to deploy the measure 
in response to public accountability concerns. Our theoretical framing engages 
conceptual elements of institutional work and public accountability research to 
consider why key actors vary in their responses to the mandated standard application 
of EVA®.  We suggest, as revealed from our empirics, that one reason for differing 
responses by the SOEs to the mandated roll-out of the measure relates to the 
institutional work by SOE chief executives, as influenced by their institutional 
potential and/or accounting centricity.  When these two factors align to the dictates 
of the higher implementing body, the level of adherence to the  EVA® mandate 
remains high notwithstanding the absence of enforcement.  When these two factors do 
not align to the dictates of the higher implementing body, accountability fails in the 
absence of enforcement, even when politicization is high and formal accountability 
                                                        
1 http://www.economist.com/news/china/21614240-reform-state-companies-back-agenda-fixing-china-
inc 
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claims are high.  Finally, if they are partially present, the accountability response is 
mixed.   
Specifically, our findings as based on three SOE firms we investigated (and 
referred to here as SOE 1, SOE 2 and SOE 3) indicated that SOE 1 exhibited 
attributes of positive blended responses, comprising “acquiescence” as well as 
“compromise” and this was primarily driven by the high accounting centricity and 
high institutional potential of the SOE 1 CEO.  SOE 2 displayed mixed blended 
responses, encompassing “compromise” and “defiance”, which we associate to the 
low accounting centricity and moderate institutional potential of the SOE 2 CEO, 
while SOE 3 exhibited the negative attributes of ”defiance” even in the presence of a 
highly political setting, with high public accountability. We argue that this resistance 
was closely aligned to the low accounting centricity and low institutional potential of 
the SOE 3 CEO.   
We thus find that variation exists in the way the novel accounting metric was 
received by SOEs, and adopt a neo-institutional perspective informed by aspects of 
the public administration literatures to explain this divergence (Table 1). Within neo-
institutionalist thinking, we specifically use institutional work theory (Lawrence, et al, 
2009) as our conceptual lens to explain how key senior individuals mobilize actions 
and inject their agency into a field through their purposive actions, leading to 
differing levels of  EVA® acceptance in the SOEs.  This view has not been adopted by 
management accounting researchers.  Suddaby (2010, p.17), a key institutional work 
theorist has noted:  
“… how little effort has been expended by institutional researchers to 
understand how institutions operate through the influence and agency of individuals. 
This is, an area of high opportunity for future inquiry”  
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Institutional work has also been implicated as a useful innovation that aids the 
advance of accounting innovations within organizational practice (Hayne and Free, 
2014).  We draw upon features of neo-institutionalism as expressed through 
institutional work theorizing in accounting (Kettunen, 2016; Canning and O’Dwyer, 
2016) and aspects of public accountability scholarship to make explicit our research 
question (Covaleski and Dirsmith 1988; Covaleski et al. 1996; Lawrence and 
Suddaby 2006; Lounsbury 2008; Scott 2013; Suddaby, 2010; Tolbert and Zucker 
1983).   
Prior studies suggest a conceptual rationale for how the political work of key 
actors in institutions defines the “private actions” of organizations and results in 
varying responses to public accountability concerns which drive regulatory action 
Klenk (2015).  The neo-institutional work literature calls for developing a stronger 
understanding of dynamic interactions and agency (Perkmann and Spicer 2008; Scott 
2013) and divergence in the styles of maintenance or disruption (Klenk 2015; 
Suddaby 2010). We address this by studying multiple SOEs, and identify variations in 
the way an accounting reporting requirement is adopted where strong political 
accountability pressures exist (Mensah et al. 2009).  Our findings enable us to present 
a modified form of the Klenk (2015) framework.  We evidence an empirical setting 
where enforcement and politicization do not align and explain the consequences of 
non-alignment.  We further explain why public sector institutions might still show 
much resistance, even where public accountability claims are high and persist.  We 
clarify that preferences of senior executives within SOEs play a significant role in 
shaping the authenticity of an accounting response (EVA® implementation) to a 
regulatory impost.  The success of an EVA® implementation is not assured and the 
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actions of key actors in organizations can affect the efficacy with which it is used 
(Ezzamel and Burns, 2005).  .   
Functionally, we apply a multiple case study method comprising three firms to 
investigate the responses of CEOs and their effects on the actions of senior 
management and staff following the mandated roll out of EVA® as an inter-
organizational control application in Chinese state-owned enterprises (SOEs)2. This 
roll out was effected by the Chinese government through the State-owned Assets 
Supervision and Administration Commission of the State Council (SASAC)3. The 
SASAC-led regulatory roll out  of EVA® , like other management process regulations 
was implemented to achieve nationally pursued economic objectives, and affected 
multiple state enterprise contexts (Wu et al. 2012; Holm 1995; Greenwood and 
Suddaby 2006; Hassard et al. 2007; Oliver 1991; Seo and Creed 2002; Zietsma and 
Lawrence 2010).  
Two of the three SOEs reveal purposive actions by key senior individuals 
(CEO) that serve to create or maintain EVA® institutionalised practices to different 
degrees (SOE 1 and SOE 2), while the third SOE CEO’s intentional actions mobilized 
the institutional disruption of the metric adoption. We explain these outcomes by 
noting the relative degrees of accountability claims pursued by the three SOEs 
through the notion of “political work” relating to their individual CEOs4. We consider 
these individuals as powerful institutional actors who seek to “…reconstruct rules, 
                                                        
2 The Chinese government defines SOEs as enterprises in which all assets are owned by the state. Central SOEs 
refer to the Chinese SOEs under the direct oversight of Central Government. As of November 2015, there are 110 
central SOEs under the supervision of SASAC. 
3 SASAC was established by the State Council at the 10th National People’s Congress of PRC held in 2003 as an 
institutional structure to separate fiduciary responsibility over state-owned assets from the government’s social and 
public management functions. The legislation enacted in 2009 gave SASAC control over the legal liabilities and 
rights of investors holding SOE shares on behalf of the state and for guiding SOE administrative reforms. 
4 Respondents from all three SOE’s identified their CEO as the most strategically influential officer in their 
SOE. 
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property rights and boundaries” (Lawrence and Suddaby 2006:122) in respect of 
EVA® expansion across SOEs, to maintain or disrupt the accounting requirement.  
   By observing how an accounting method is received in three institutions 
differently, our findings enable us to refine certain neo-institutionalist claims (Klenk 
2015; Oliver1991; Lawrence and Suddaby 2006).  The manner by which we 
empirically validate the variation in responses arising from different SOE CEOs and 
associate it to the “political work” (Lawrence et al., 2011) of these key agents, and 
subsequently identify two factors driving this plurality (accounting centricity and 
institutional potential) to provide explanatory clarity as to why these purposive 
actions usurp the more structural effects posed by traditional institutionalism extends 
beyond what the prior literature has been able to advance (Wu et al. 2012; Tu et al.. 
2013; Chen et al.. 2008; Lei et al. 2013; Young et al. 2015).  Our study thus not only 
directly extends  management accounting research but also adds to scholarly 
accountability discourse by exploring the strategic responses of enterprises required to 
deploy a standard management accounting control indicator.  
The rest of the paper is organised as follows: in the next section, we discuss 
how alignment with managerial accounting regulatory requirements can differ, 
drawing on the neo-institutional work literature. We subsequently explain our 
research method, present our findings and elaborate upon and discuss the implications 
of the paper in advancing existing research. We finally present concluding comments, 
acknowledge the study’s limitations and offer suggestions for future research. 
 
2. Theory 
Theoretically, we align our perspective with “neo-institutionalist” foundations 
which stress intentional agency (see Lounsbury 2008; Oliver 1991; Klenk 2015) and 
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process (Lawrence and Suddaby 2006; Lawrence et al. 2013; Malsch and Gendron 
2013) relative to the social constructivist precursor studies (Fogarty 1992; Haniffa and 
Cooke 2005; Covaleski and Dirsmith 1988; Meyer and Rowan 1977; DiMaggio and 
Powell 1983; Scott 2004a; 2004b). While these literatures are vast, we focus on key 
studies that inform our argument tied to local agency and its effects on the embedding 
of an accounting technology. Within the accounting academic literature, neo-
institutional research has been regarded as offering potential for explaining regulatory 
outcomes (Canning and O’Dwyer, 2016), as well as understanding how accounting 
technology accomplishes change in organizational practice (Hayne and Free, 2014; 
Sharma, et al, 2014). However, few studies have reflected upon the conceptual 
underpinnings of this emerging perspective in the field which identifies 
organizationally and politically engaged agency (Greenwood and Suddaby 2006; Wu 
et al. 2012).  
  Traditional institutionalism has focused on the strong linkage between rational 
formal structures in shaping behaviors (Covaleski et al. 1996; Selznick 1996), 
whereby these structures can take the form of schemes, norms, rules and routines, and 
serve as authoritative guidelines (Scott 2004a). Our emphasis is on the role of actors 
in effecting, transforming, and maintaining institutions and fields, with a view to 
enhancing the understanding of how proactive human agency shapes institutionally 
driven practices (Holm 1995; Lawrence and Suddaby 2006; Oliver 1991; Seo and 
Creed 2002; Zietsma and Lawrence 2010). In this sense, institutional work offers a 
theoretical rationale for charting the purposive actions of key actors in shaping 
organizational responses to accounting implementations, as they relate to public 
accountability claims.  It posits the possibility that strategy and power might impact 
institutional rationales whilst not negating the idea of actors displaying cognitive, 
9 
 
purposeful human agency (Beckert 1999) as opposed to a more affective, reactive 
agency impacting institutional processes. Consequently, Lawrence, et al (2011:52) 
hail institutional work as the theoretical pivot within neo-institutionalism with the 
potential to:  
“…contribute to bringing the individual back into institutional theory, help to 
re-examine the relationship between agency and institutions, and provide a bridge 
between critical and institutional views of organization” . 
 
The descriptor “work” in institutional work refers to a broad range of actions 
undertaken by individuals to purposively affect the institution within which they exist.  
Lawrence, et al (2011: 53) define “work” as:  
“…the efforts of individuals and collective  actors to cope with, keep up with, 
shore up, tear down, tinker with, transform, or create anew the institutional structures 
within which they live, work, and play, and which give them their roles, relationships, 
resources, and routines” 
 
Oliver (1991) favors considering agency in this manner whereby she ideates that 
organizations embark on strategic behaviors to manage institutional processes. In 
doing so, Oliver (1991) identifies a typology of five responses, in decreasing order of 
passiveness, as acquiescence, compromise, avoidance, defiance and manipulation 
choices. Oliver (1991) goes on to explicitly make political human agency as part of 
the strategic responses put forward, acknowledging self-interest and organizational 
control as scope conditions under which the degree of conformity arises as part of an 
institutional process. Perkmann and Spicer (2008) similarly allude to this political 
component and its impact on key actor actions.  
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 Within accounting research, institutional work has been studied in wide 
ranging accounting phenomena, including the linguistic translation of international 
accounting standards (Kettunen, 2016), or the way in which this more broadly affects 
the role of IFRS as a global trans lingual institution (Canning and O’Dwyer; 2016).  
Institutional work has also been implicated in explaining how social media 
professionals impact change in accounting domains by affecting the boundary work, 
rhetorical work and the manner by which an embedded actor in the accountancy 
profession is constructed (Suddaby, et al 2015).   
The above studies are broadly generalized for a range of different institutional 
conditions but do not specifically explain how institutional work affects accounting 
innovation.  Hayne and Free (2014) explain how risk management is mobilized 
through the work of key individuals within a key risk management publication entity, 
but arguably refrain from explicating how the actions of key actors might 
simultaneously add and detract from the progress of an accounting innovation, and 
unpick the underlying personal drivers for the same.  
How do we theorize the mechanism through which such action manifests in our 
specific and unique, highly visible public sector setting? Klenk (2015) builds on 
Kraatz and Block (2008), Meyer and Rowan (1977) and Oliver (1991), specifically 
theorizing four organizational reactions (Acquiescence, Compromising strategies, 
Compartmentalizing and Defiance) to public accountability pressures. This 
perspective allows us to interpret our empirically observed SOE institutional 
responses. We provide brief descriptions of the possible reactions via two scales. One 
scale being the level of enforcement and politicization experienced by the 
organization and the second scale being the intensity of the formal accountability 
claims imposed by external stakeholders/constituents (see Table 1). Enforcement is 
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observed when accountability mechanisms are put into effect by agents to ensure 
desirable behaviors, while politicization occurs when there exists a visible public 
attention on the stated issue, and this leads to controversial public debate. The 
intensity of formal accountability claims refers to the extent to which the general 
public or governing body (SASAC) judges about the legitimacy of the actions of a 
particular entity (Bovens 2005). 
Klenk (2015) sees Acquiescence as compliance with set rules and norms, through 
conscious obedience or unconscious imitation (mimetic isomorphism). This outcome 
is argued for when the level of enforcement/politicization is high, and the intensity of 
public accountability claims is high. Compromise occurs when public accountability 
claims are high, but the level of politicization/enforcement is low. This “compromise” 
occurs when organizations try to pacify constituents and stakeholder demands by 
negotiating concessions that serve to appease stakeholders to different degrees. Third, 
is when organizations engage in Compartmentalizing. Compartmentalizing occurs 
when the level of enforcement and politicization is low, but stakeholder/constituent 
accountability claims are high. Organizations therefore attempt to provide the “veneer” 
of engaging in desirable action and expect to avoid scrutiny owing to low 
enforcement/politicization. This may manifest as a sequential treatment of different 
accountability claims in some order, or by the creation of a separate unit to 
demonstrate an organizations’ commitment to accountability. The key difference 
between this approach and “Acquiescence” is that there generally exists less 
authenticity here. Organizations create such structures to placate stakeholder 
claims/concerns (which are high), without necessarily engaging in the actual actions 
desired by stakeholders as the issue concerned has not been politicized, nor enforced. 
This approach aligns with the early notion of decoupling presented by Meyer and 
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Rowan (1977). Finally, organizations may more concertedly reject or refute the public 
accountability claim by Defiance – where organizations dismiss, challenge or attack 
the claims of external constituents or stakeholders. 
We mobilize this element of institutional work to explain the purposive actions of 
key actors in SOEs. Formally, Lawrence and Suddaby (2006: 216) define institutional 
work as “…the broad category of purposive action aimed at creating, maintaining 
and disrupting institutions…” and “as intelligent, situated institutional action”. They 
class institutional work as the work of actors in shaping processes and in creating, 
maintaining and disrupting institutions. Oliver (1991) also emphasizes the plausibility 
of organizational actors deinstitutionalizing processes, thus highlighting the active 
role of individuals and organizations in the maintenance of institutions. They 
specifically evidence how non-passive actors shape institutional processes (Suddaby 
2010; Lawrence et al. 2011). We broadly draw on the insights provided by Klenk 
(2015), Lawrence and Suddaby (2006), and Lawrence (1999) relating to the political 
work of organizational actors in different strategic contexts. 
In drawing upon neo-institutional work theorizing, we heed the importance of 
political work, as it relates to the purposeful actions of SOE CEOs. From an 
institutional work perspective, CEOs have the authority to reconstruct rules, property 
rights and boundaries reflecting their personal aims (Lawrence and Suddaby 2006) by 
driving senior management actions. Elster (1997) identifies political studies as 
extending across different political traditions. When related to instrumental politics, 
Elster (1997) sees individuals pursuing selfish interests where their “work” is not 
defined by a purpose that goes beyond the attainment of personal satisfaction. While 
we cannot argue to speak for the mind-set of the SOE CEOs, we contend that their 
ability to imprint their personal views on SOE managers eager to support them as 
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grounds upon which, authentic or not, their “political work” translates into purposeful 
actions within SOEs. We explore how the political work of SOE CEOs in response to 
SASAC’s mandated EVA® implementation impacts the way in which EVA® is used. 
Prior research has evidenced the strong political capital wielded by these powerful 
individuals at the SOE level, and the difficulty faced by the broader public in 
observing or evaluating their behaviors: 
“In theory, SOEs are owned by the citizenry of China, who are too dispersed and 
powerless to play any monitoring role. Therefore, the state and its designated 
government agencies might not have the appropriate incentives to monitor the 
operations of SOEs closely. The state-appointed manager (CEO) becomes the sole 
commander of the company and often seeks to maximize his own welfare.”  
(Lei et al. 2013, p.148)  
The implementation of EVA® as a result of a national pursuit for greater SOE 
accountability and profitability and its antecedent drivers have not been expounded in 
the literature. The strong political landscape of public sector organizations lend 
themselves to “unintended managerial side effects” as a result of public pressures for 
tackling high bureaucracy, low innovation and process responsibility and myopic 
vision (Verbeeten 2008). Du et al. (2012) highlight the political connections between 
SOEs and SASAC, favoring the more powerful SOEs. Mol (1996:74) considers that 
accounting indicators applied in the public sector are often “…collected without any 
attempt to derive some general conclusion with respect to performance from them” 
leading to their limited use. In relation to EVA®, the efforts of the Chinese 
government and SASAC to affect the practices of SOEs are extensive. Since its 
creation in 2003, SASAC assumed the fiduciary responsibility for state-owned assets 
and acted as an investor and manager of SOEs. SOEs subsequently evidenced rapid 
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growth and soon became the subject of criticism for pursuing size, destroying value 
and crowding out opportunities for a more efficiency-focused and value-creating 
private sector (Chen et al. 2006; Chen et al. 2011; Firth et al. 2008). In the face of the 
criticisms voiced, SASAC altered its objective as formalised in its progressive five-
year plans from SOEs aiming to “become bigger” (2006-2010) to their “pursuing 
excellence” and seeking a “value-based” strategy for growth (2011-2015). SASAC 
stipulated the adoption by SOEs of EVA®-based performance reporting which was to 
be used by all central SOEs from 20105. While some SOEs adopted EVA®, others 
showed resistance to differing degrees.   
Our method discussed in the next part of the paper explains how we consider the 
implementation of EVA® across Chinese SOEs as a political response to public 
accountability concerns which we assess within the neo-institutionalist political work 
frame explained above. We theorize the organizational responses from our three 
SOEs in this light. 
 
3. Method   
3.1 Research field and empirical context 
Our field concerns itself with the extent of acceptance to the institutionalization of 
the new EVA® accounting reporting system for use by central SOEs as mandated by 
SASAC. To explore this, our empirical inquiry considers data relating to SASAC as 
well as three central SOE case companies and their subsidiaries. In depth case studies 
allow us to explore the convergence and variation of unfolding events across the three 
SOEs impacted institutionally (Yin 2009).  
                                                        
5 Table 2 shows the evolution of the PMSs advanced by SASAC for implementation within central SOEs from 
2003 
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Central SOEs control a wide range of smaller SOEs and play a critical role in the 
Chinese and the world economy. They comprise 70 percent of the profits of over 
120,000 SOEs equivalent to 20 percent of government revenues. Listed subsidiaries 
of central SOEs account for a third of the market capitalization value of Chinese 
domestic stock exchanges6. At the end of 2015, the total assets owned by central 
SOEs amounted to 53.7 trillion RMB ($8.4 trillion US) with operating revenues of 28 
trillion RMB ($4.4 trillion US) and annual earnings of 1.7 trillion RMB ($267 billion 
US).   
SASAC voiced its reaction to the criticisms levelled at the scale growth strategy in 
the 11th Five-Year Plan (2006-2010) by articulating a new strategy for SOEs in the 
12th Five-Year plan (2011-2015). The objective for SOEs under the latest plan was to 
“pursue excellence” and to “reinforce value creation” and “force managers to think on 
behalf of the shareholders”, rather than a mission to “become bigger”.7 The manner 
by which SASAC progressed the expansion of EVA® into SOEs is identified in Table 
2. 
[Insert Table 2 here] 
 
The calculation of EVA® and the method of assessment encompassed in SASAC’s 
new goals implemented in 2010-2012 are shown in Tables 2 and 3. The performance 
of the central SOEs and their senior managers is assessed annually based on total 
scores achieved. Executive salaries, bonuses, and career development are significantly 
affected by the categories and the scores achieved. To examine the role of the EVA® 
system as part of the strategic transition advanced by SASAC, we utilise empirical 
data relating to SASAC as well as to three central SOEs and their subsidiaries. We 
                                                        
6 Chinese Statistical Year Book, 2009, 2010 and 2011. 
7SASAC, Annual Review of Central SOE Performance, 2006. 
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also assess the existence of compromise and negotiation in the manner by which 
SASAC conducted its EVA® calculation. SASAC demonstrated a penchant for 
compromising or softening its stance on the manner by which EVA® is calculated, or 
on the lower requisite EVA® thresholds for SOEs lacking clear revenue models, or 
with longer term strategic interests that do not align to an annual calculative approach.  
We find deviations toward adverse behavior that exist even with these generous 
adjustments by SASAC – therefore revealing a latent dissatisfaction by powerful SOE 
actors, and their consequent efforts to manage the EVA® figure contributed to 
SASAC. 
 
[Insert Table 3 and 4 here] 
 
3.2 Data Sources 
We use a multi-case field study approach to explore the relationship between 
EVA® and strategic actions which followed at both the national and firm level. We 
chose three case companies which operate in three different industries, have different 
strategies, and are subject to different levels of government intervention. This allows 
for the development, extension and replication of conceptual theorization across 
different case contexts (Eisenhardt and Graebner 2007). Our empirical data collection 
was conducted in three steps: firstly, we collected background information on the 
application of the EVA® system in central SOEs including the preliminary effects of 
SASAC’s new system on multiple central SOEs based on data obtained from 
government agencies. In the second step, based on the analysis of this preliminary 
data, we identified three central SOEs enabling the application of the centrally 
designed control system to be assessed. We conducted 16 interviews with SASAC 
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officers and managers at the three central SOEs and their subsidiaries. Internal and 
external documents on the companies and information of their EVA®-systems were 
also collected. After coding and analysing the data, in the third step of the data 
collection, fourteen interviews were undertaken to further capture the effects of 
political drivers on behaviors of SOE managers and their understanding and responses 
to the new system. In total, thirty interviews were conducted with 27 SOE executives 
and managers8. A summary of the interview respondent list and their distribution 
across SASAC and the three SOEs is provided in Appendix I. 
 
[Insert Appendix I here] 
 
Field notes were taken and compared during data analysis. The interviews were 
semi-structured with discussions centered on issues including concerns in relation to 
the change to an EVA®-system, how the EVA® was implemented in the SOEs and 
received within their subsidiaries, how the system was used by SASAC in evaluating 
the performance of SOEs and their subsidiaries, and finally the impact of the system 
implementation on strategies and management decisions in the SOEs and their 
subsidiaries.   
 
3.3 Data Analysis  
Our recorded field data was assessed using a software content analysis approach 
(Nvivo 8.0) whereby the data was coded to ensure that there was no selective choice 
of data in developing the study’s findings. The analysis was carried out in two steps 
as described below. 
                                                        
8 Three interviewees were interviewed twice as indicated in the Appendix I.  
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We first examined our field data (the interview transcripts and the internal and 
external documents) to identify emergent patterns concerning the deployment and 
effects of the EVA ® system by SASAC. We coded the interview scripts and internal 
documents to assess any patterns of control effects in the three central SOEs. This 
analysis gave an indication of EVA® implementation issues and gave clarity over how 
strategic and operational decisions were influenced by the change in the system. We 
then performed a more detailed analysis of the text data, defining the acceptance of 
the change to EVA®-based system as either strong or weak. The interpretation of the 
text data was discussed and confirmed by the authors. Our analysis of the interviews 
however offers much greater depth as to the type and nature of effects beyond 
strong/weak categorization enabled by data content analysis. 
 
4. Findings & Discussion 
In this section, we assess the empirical information collected, and discuss our findings 
through the Klenk (2015) public accountability framework.  We highlight the EVA® 
system’s acceptance (or lack of) by the SOEs and its impacts on the strategic and 
operating choices of managers across the three central SOEs under study. We 
interweave our empirical observations with explanations of their theoretical 
significance in order to allow for a manageable explanation of the findings and their 
significance to the study’s claimed contributions. 
EVA® was viewed as an accounting metric that influenced SOE strategic behavior, 
in large part by shaping the corporate values of managers in relation to profit seeking 
in investments. Notwithstanding their criticisms of the EVA® system (see below), a 
manager in SOE 3 noted: 
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As a supervised enterprise, we recognized the effects and benefits of EVA®. We 
also want to make use of this tool to manage downward. If an enterprise wants to 
excel in the long run, it needs to be supported by a belief ... In this sense, [EVA is] 
a good thing. (Interviewee 18) 
 
SASAC communicated the ethos associated with the new EVA® system by 
engaging all senior central SOE managers in training sessions on EVA® measures. 
Central SOEs also organized their own training on EVA® in their subsidiaries. In 
doing so, EVA® became a map for guiding management pursuits through the 
hierarchical structure of central SOEs. The alignment of SOE managers’ mindset 
around a profit orientation tied to EVA® was considered important in directing this 
strategic refocus.  To this extent, the politicization of EVA® by SASAC into SOEs is 
clearly noted, and the high level of formal accountability claims by the general 
community and SASAC regarding SOE efficiency is acknowledged.  The existence of 
much public conversation and debate (Klenk, 2015), led to the central regulatory body 
(here SASAC) implementing strong accountability claims on SOEs via EVA®.  
We commence with an analysis of our evidence collected regarding the activities 
undertaken by SASAC to enact EVA® across all SOEs, then discuss the responses  of 
three SOEs in designing and submitting their respective EVA® values.  We analyze 
the responses in relation to the extent to which the SOEs engaged in “Acquiescence”, 
“Compartmentalization”, “Compromise”, “Defiance” or combinations of these. In 
mobilizing these responses, we theorize rationales driving key senior individuals’ 
purposive behaviors across the three SOEs.  “Acquiescence” relates to a high level of 
compliance with external rules or norms, while “Compromise” occurs when 
constituents are pacified and stakeholder demands are balanced through negotiations. 
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“Compartmentalization” occurs when organizations might create separate business 
units that demonstrate the organizations’ commitment to the accountability demands 
of external stakeholder without concertedly affecting internal change while “Defiance” 
is an active resistance strategy where an organization dismisses, challenges or attacks 
the accountability demands of an external stakeholder. 
 
Central SOEs have seen their assets and profits grow since they were established.  
Criticism of their strategies have however been expressed forcing a re-assessment of 
their scale performance focus9.  
Faced with significant external political pressure arising from scale based growth 
squeezing private sector access to capital, dissatisfaction with the management of the 
SOEs by SASAC and the Chinese Government was being voiced. SASAC 
consequently sought to effect changes as the guardian of state assets by introducing 
EVA® as a new accounting metric for evaluating central SOEs. The EVA 
implementation therefore involved a strong political imperative. The system was 
structured as noted in Table 4. 
Intense training at different organizational levels and the advancement of value 
creation by SASAC enabled the extension of the EVA® system in central SOEs, at a 
time where the government was strongly emphasizing its implementation.  EVA® as 
                                                        
9 Concerns have been raised in relation to the rapid development of SOEs. First, SOEs have been criticized for 
having low profitability, lacking investment efficiency and evidencing poor corporate governance. Mok and Chua 
(2003) find that state ownership in listed firms by the government are negatively related to profitability, 
particularly in bad economic times. Chen et al. (2011) find that political connections of listed SOEs significantly 
reduce their investment efficiency. Similarly, Firth et al. (2012) also provide evidence to advance the idea that the 
government has multiple socio-economic objectives for SOEs other than pursuing value maximization when 
making investment decisions. Firth et al. (2006) examines the compensation of CEOs in China's listed firms and 
find that firms with a state ownership do not appear to use performance related pay or do so with very low 
intensity. Second, the fast growth of SOEs has been attributed to the favorable treatment they receive over private 
firms given their close ties to the government (such as financing from state-owned banks). Firth et al. (2008) find 
that low growth and poorly performing firms with greater ownership have fewer restrictions on their capital 
expenditures financed via state-owned banks, which result in an overinvestment bias in SOEs. Lu et al. (2012) 
provide evidence that private firms (non-SOEs) are more likely to face bank discrimination for political reasons 
relative to SOEs.  
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envisaged by SASAC was intended to become intertwined into the SOE accounting 
evaluation processes to alter management action. Notwithstanding the high level of 
politicization that accompanies the implementation of EVA® into SOEs, the extent to 
which EVA® adherence is enforced upon SOEs remains weak. 
 
SASAC officers were open to being flexible with SOEs in relation to the EVA® 
calculation, especially regarding strategically important assets such as grain supply 
and SOE resources invested into the management of natural disasters.  As explained 
by the manager of a control division in SOE 1: 
 
Since we [SOEs] have to shoulder a lot of social responsibilities, it is unfair to 
entirely evaluate our performance based on value-based measures. For example, 
some of our subsidiaries have to make sure that the grain supply is sufficient 
around the country and they have to keep the grain price stable even if it 
fluctuates… (Interviewee 7) 
 
A manager from SOE 3 similarly commented that SASAC’s targets were always 
open to negotiation, even when directly relating to non-current assets in the balance 
sheets of an SOE: 
  
I will give you another example: there has been a large amount of international 
investment, virtually worth nothing, which has been sitting on our account for a 
very long time... During the evaluation process, we argued with SASAC that since 
the investment wasn’t made by us, we should not be held responsible… Eventually 
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SASAC agreed to adjust our original target downward in light of this loss. 
(Interviewee 23) 
 
The above examples evidence the flexibility of SASAC in administering EVA®10. 
They simultaneously reveal a unique combination of high politicization and low 
enforcement, unlike the traditional framework proposed by Klenk (2015) which 
assumes enforcement to align with politicization. High politicization is driven by the 
strong mandate divested by the China Government onto SASAC, which arose from 
public pressure concerning the lack of efficiency in SOEs.   This was complemented 
by low enforcement, owing to the need for SASAC to manage the multiple 
accountability claims of some SOEs with key longer term performance goals that 
might be independent of annual profitability.   
We now explain the manner by which three different SOE’s manifested different 
types of responses to the EVA®  implementation.  We proceed to examine the effects 
of the accounting system change to EVA® on subsidiaries’ actions and decisions in 
three different central SOEs. In particular, we focus on the extent to which EVA® 
affected SOE reporting activities, integrating these findings within our theoretical 
framework. 
 
4.1 Blended public accountability responses 
A key contribution of our study is the identification of blended responses to public 
accountability by organizations, combining elements of different responses proposed 
by Klenk (2015). One of the reasons for this blending is the nature of the political 
work conducted by key senior executives, as is in evidence from the findings.  We 
                                                        
10 We conducted additional interviews to ascertain the uniformity in SASAC’s flexibility across annual 
reviews, versus end of term reviews.  We were advised that there was no substantive difference in the 
flexibility inherent in SASAC’s evaluation style across these two evaluation types. 
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proceed to discuss the blended responses of SOE 1 (Acquiescence and Compromise) 
and SOE 2 (Compromise and Defiance).  We characterise the public accountability 
response of SOE 1 as blended and positive with respect to EVA® acceptance, while 
SOE 2’s response we class as blended and mixed, as is evidenced from the findings.  
Finally, we characterize the unilateral (non-blended) response of SOE 3 (Defiance) 
wholly negative. 
 
4.1a Positive Blended Response - Acquiescence and Compromise (SOE 1) 
SOE1 is a Fortune 500 conglomerate with a number of subsidiaries which operate 
across various sectors including real estate, hotels, agriculture and food, non-grain 
bio-energy, packaging, and finance.  
We proceed to explain how SOE 1 exhibited a combination of the Acquiescence 
and Compromise strategic response modes, building on Oliver (1991) and  Klenk’s 
(2015) extension.   The reason for this blending of both responses rests in the political 
work of the CEO of SOE 1. The legitimacy of CEO 1 (Suchman, 1995) arises from 
his strong Ivy League educational background as well as the broader political 
hierarchy viewing him favorably.  As will be explained, the CEO exercises his 
internal influence (Kraatz and Block, 2008) within SOE 1 to ensure staff applied 
EVA® though there existed mis-alignment with their activities (Acquiescence).  The 
CEO also exercised his external influence to drive SASAC to show greater flexibility 
with SOE 1, driving negotiation regarding EVA® targets (Compromise). Theoretically, 
this style of response manifested in an environment where SASAC did not apply any 
material form of enforcement (Moore, 2014).  The Klenk (2015) framework indicates 
acquiescence and compromise strategic responses are mobilized when politicization 
and enforcement are simultaneously high (see Table 1).  We find these responses 
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when politicization is high and enforcement is low, theoretically departing from 
extant public accountability literatures (Brandsma and Schillemans, 2012). We 
explain that SOE CEO 1’s high level of accounting centricity and institutional 
potential drove the EVA® application by his staff, thereby advancing Lawrence, et al 
(2009) and Klenk (2015) by specifically theorizing rationales for the departures 
observed from the way public accountability responses are cognized.   
 
Functionally, the organization structure of SOE 1 lent itself to adopting EVA® 
more seamlessly, as explained by the Finance Manager of one subsidiary of SOE 1: 
…all our subsidiaries are organized as divisions so that we are all report to 
headquarters. The HQ has very strong control over us, which makes it easier for 
our boss to push the EVA® measure down the whole group. (Interviewee 12) 
 
But why might the CEO welcome the EVA® method to begin with? Theoretically, 
the political work of the SOE 1 CEO is strongly implicated in the SOE 1 response to 
public accountability demands. The CEO of SOE 1 obtained an MBA in the early 
1980’s from a USA Ivy League university and is a highly respected individual 
amongst SASAC officials and the broader Chinese governmental bureaucracy. He 
obtained his qualifications at a time when few Chinese graduates held overseas 
degrees, and even fewer from such a highly reputed institution. For this reason, he 
was earmarked from an early stage for progression through the “ranks”, and is 
currently CEO of SOE 1, a larger and more influential SOE relative to the other two 
we investigate. He is highly respected by his subordinates in SOE 1, and has a track 
record for institutionalizing new innovative practices, often Western management 
practices in SOEs that he has advanced in the past.  From this perspective, the SOE 1 
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CEO has a high level of accounting centricity – which we define as the ability to 
accept and work with accounting constructs.  The respect with which the CEO of SOE 
1 is held by SASAC, his marking for progression amongst the China political elite as 
well as his Harvard education and preference for Western management techniques 
strongly aligns to his likelihood of supporting the EVA® implementation and driving 
its authentic use in SOE 1.  As explained by the Vice Manager of the Strategic 
Development Department: 
 
Our CEO has a great reputation in orchestrating innovation. ... His prior 
experience as the CEO of another large SOE was very successful. His value-based 
management system at his previous SOE was a big hit in the management world. 
He is renowned for advocating and supporting the implementation of westernized 
accounting concepts. ... he is more receptive to new ideas like EVA®.  
(Interviewee 9) 
 
The SOE 1 CEO possessed a significant influence over other senior managers at 
SOE 1 in accepting the accounting innovation. His Ivy League educational 
background, and history of enabling accounting innovations likely affected SOE 1’s 
re-orientation of its investment choice making, in replacing ROE with EVA® as the 
performance measure with the largest weight.  
 
Two initiatives were driven by the SOE 1 CEO to maximize the likelihood of 
EVA® acceptance into SOE 1 subsidiaries. This included the implementation of bonus 
systems on managers for attaining EVA® targets, and the inculcation of training 
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programs to foster greater management understanding of the EVA® method and its 
implementation rationale:   
 
I think the most important channel through which the intentions of senior 
executives translate down is through the bonus of lower level staff...  I guess in the 
beginning stage of the implementation of EVA®, we had a lot of training sessions 
for our subsidiaries. It definitely helped too. (Interviewee 6) 
 
After the transition to EVA®, the headquarters of SOE 1 assessed the performance 
of all its subsidiaries (first-tier) and business units (second-tier) using EVA®. Overall, 
a 50% weight was accorded to financial measures (EVA® and profit) and the other 50% 
encompassing operating measures, such as quality and delivery. The EVA® system 
was sufficiently influential so as to enable an authentic alteration of the weighting of 
SOE 1 measures, subsequently changing their strategic choices.  
Functionally, EVA® was used to achieve more efficient resource allocation. A 
finance manager at the headquarters of SOE 1 emphasized the changing focus from 
government equity to private debt, caused by subsidiaries not wanting to take on 
government capital obligations requiring high market based returns:  
 
In the past… in most cases, the subsidiaries just made excuses and refused to 
return the capital back to us. … Now with EVA ®, they voluntarily return the idle 
capital to us. … From their point of view, it is much cheaper to seek funding from 
banks… (Interviewee 5) 
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SOE 1 managers also assessed the lower EVA® levels within their own businesses, 
allowing units in lower yielding industries a lower EVA® target. Discussions and 
debate ensued regarding the relative movement of EVA® targets, and their 
comparative difficulty of attainment:   
 
We noticed this problem of EVA® some time ago and in practice we set targeted 
values for EVA® and use ‘ΔEVA®’ that is change in EVA® as a performance 
indicator. We then can set lower target for those low EVA® -based companies.   
(Interviewee 13) 
 
SOE 1’s acceptance of EVA® was also driven by the inevitability of its use as a 
control form imposed by SASAC: 
 
I think there is an understanding that a unit will be left behind or be merged with 
others if you continue to develop on the previous basis [pre-EVA®]. (Interviewee 5) 
 
Given the influence that the CEO of SOE 1 possessed, and the influence wielded 
by SOE 1 as a central unit, one might expect greater levels of resistance to the less 
aligned aspects of the EVA® implementation as explained above, in light of 
disagreements with certain aspects of the EVA® implementation. However, SOE 1’s 
CEO had positioned himself as an innovative executive, pioneering western 
management practices in SOEs. His political influence and ambition drove his 
willingness for adherence, not resistance. This impacted his approach to making 
EVA® work in SOE 1. The Vice Manager of the Strategic Development Department 
at the headquarters of SOE1 explained that: 
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Hierarchy wise, our CEO is at the same rank as the vice director of SASAC. He 
has a very bright career ahead of him. He is well respected… I think that we would 
want to perform well in the evaluation ourselves in the first place. It would look 
bad on him and all of us for a company as large as us to fail to meet our target. 
That would mean that we are destroying values instead of creating ones. He has a 
lot at stake here. I am sure he feels pressured to do well in the performance, like 
all of us. (Interviewee 9) 
 
Theoretically, we argue that from an institutional work perspective, the SOE 1 
CEO stands to advance high institutional potential in his SOE, SASAC and the 
broader government structure.  His acquiescence to the EVA® innovation and 
willingness to work with it notwithstanding its limitations does not arise from a “fear” 
of SASAC, but rather a posturing for future political gain. To this extent, he was 
ready to do whatever was necessary to “acquiesce”, owing to the high politicization of 
the EVA® implementation.   
 
In SOE 1, managers placed significant effort on producing accounting calculations 
and reports in as objective a manner as possible. Even when the pressure existed to 
“prop” a strategically important but less profitable business unit, managers trusted the 
numbers and refrained from doing this, pointing to the need for “truth from the facts 
and focus on numbers that cannot be forged” (Interviewee 8),  thus adhering to the 
EVA® process irrespective of other SOE behaviors or responses to EVA®. 
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The SOE 1 CEO’s strong reputation within SASAC also played a role in 
empowering SOE 1 to negotiate (compromise) with SASAC, especially when China 
suffered an economic downturn in 2012-13.   
 
The overall performance of SOEs hasn’t been good. I think the EVA® evaluation by 
SASAC has become more flexible and there is more room for negotiation. SASAC 
has relaxed their rule and allowed the target to be adjusted in the mid-year 
evaluation…during the mid-year evaluation, we bargained with SASAC that since 
the economy hasn’t been rosy, the EVA® target for the whole year should be 
adjusted downwards. (Interviewee 6) 
 
SASAC allowed more room for negotiation over the calculation of EVA® during 
the evaluation, allowing an expansion of lower cost of capital benchmarks to a wider 
range of industries within SOE 1’s businesses operations. 
 
Managers in SOE 1 feel some pressure to align their longer term strategic 
endeavors (whose benefits are difficult to express) using a short term profitability 
value to EVA®, and acknowledge that projects that used to be favorably considered 
now show negative or zero EVA® returns, causing consternation amongst managers. 
Notwithstanding the above functional mis-alignment, the presence of dysfunctional 
behaviors in SOE 1 appears less marked.  Conceptually, therefore, we see strong 
alignment in the strategic response of SOE 1 to EVA® institutionalization with the 
acquiescence mode, and subsequently the compromise mode as explained in Klenk 
(2015). In the main, management followed the directives of SASAC consistently, 
virtually adopting the “textbook” application of EVA®, even implementing adverse 
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and inequitable reporting of the performance of some of its segments when 
complications arose (Hill and Hupe, 2009). There existed a high level of compliance, 
evidenced by a conscious effort from SOE 1 management to follow the dictates of 
EVA®. However, SOE 1 also negotiated with SASAC to lower EVA® thresholds, in 
response to deteriorating macroeconomic conditions, and with an undertaking to 
better train and educate staff. From this perspective, SOE 1 adopted a Compromise 
strategic response to a lesser extent. We link this hybridized strategic response mode 
of acquiescence and compromisee to the political work of the CEO of SOE 1, 
exercising his influence to ensure adherence in the face of mis-alignment 
(Acquiescence) while also enabling SASAC to show greater flexibility with SOE 1, 
driving compromise regarding EVA® targets. Theoretically, what is of note about this 
response is that it occurred without any strong enforcement from SASAC (Moore, 
2014).  Unlike Moore (2014), however, the absence of enforcement did not affect the 
authenticity of the EVA® implementation. Though the public accountability 
framework as proposed by Klenk (2015) argued for the acquiescence and compromise 
strategic responses to be mobilized when politicization and enforcement are both high 
(see Table 1), our findings reveal that there existed a high politicization of the EVA 
implementation, but low enforcement of its implementation.  Instead, it was driven by 
the political work of the SOE 1 CEO, most closely argued by the “Politicization” 
variable in the Klenk (2015) model.  Why did he act in consonance with SASAC’s  
EVA®  impost, though it did not align to the activities of his institution?  His high 
level of accounting centricity and institutional potential drove his acceptance of the 
EVA® method, and his driving of its authentic implementation to his junior staff.  
These two drivers counters Moore’s (2014) finding that the enforcement of an 
implementation is requisite for its success.   Theoretically, our findings reveal the 
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manner by which “institutional work” literatures (Lawrence, et al 2009) explain 
departures from public accountability responses as frameworked in Klenk (2015) and  
prescribed in Moore (2014). Further, our results lend support to the influence of key 
actors contributing to the legitimacy of key institutions, reinforcing Meyer and Scott 
(1983).  
Our findings in relation to SOE 1 further provide empirical support for the claims 
of Perkmann and Spicer (2008), who consider the political motivations driving the 
nature of institutional work conducted by “hypermuscular” institutional actors (such 
as CEOs), and those within the sphere of their influence (Suddaby 2010). They 
additionally advance Du et al. (2012), who claim favorable subjective evaluations for 
more influential SOEs. We observe how institutional work as evidenced through the 
political work undertaken by the SOE 1 CEO explains how SOE 1 might exhibit 
tenets of acquiescence in relation to EVA® even when it did not suit them (possessing 
strong institutional influence, the CEO sought to ingratiate himself to SASAC) but 
was afforded strong negotiation influence when requesting for compromise (SASAC 
wanted to appease a potentially powerful future government official). The more subtle 
defining of this acceptance has not been proposed in prior accounting studies (Tu et al. 
2013).   
 
4.1b Mixed blended response – Compromise and Defiance (SOE 2) 
SOE 2 is a leading enterprise group in China dealing with the development and 
production of products and technologies tied to carbon reduction and energy-saving. 
While not as large as SOE 1, it has over 250 subsidiaries across the country. EVA® is 
part of the performance evaluation system of first-tier subsidiaries in SOE 2.  
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Theoretically, we explain how SOE 2 was dismissive of the EVA® metric indicator, 
but in a matter that reflected negotiation and a softer form of resistance (defiance) 
against SASAC, unlike that associated to Defiance as per Klenk (2015). In this sense, 
SOE 2 simultaneously exhibited the “Compromise”” and “Defiance” strategic 
responses.  We also acknowledge its “Defiance” as not rooted in the stronger 
“challenge” or “attack” descriptors, but the softer “dismissive” descriptor. Klenk 
(2015), consistent with Oliver (1991), characterizes defiance as being an intention to 
dismiss, challenge or attack, but we observe an empirical setting where defiance 
occurs more subtly, and intermingles with an intention to compromise in contexts that 
are strategically impossible to reconcile with an EVA® application. 
 
SOE 2 managers frequently expressed concern about the applicability of EVA® to 
their carbon reduction and energy saving investments, aligning with competing 
objectives advanced by the government that China should be more energy efficient 
and “clean” in its manufacturing processes. 
When faced with more financial prudence which the EVA® metric implementation 
promoted, SOE 2 managers reacted strongly and adversely.  While the logic for the 
resistance was functionally coherent, the background of the SOE 2 CEO was a factor 
underlying the less enthusiastic reception of EVA® in SOE 2, relative to SOE 1. The 
SOE 2 CEO came from a non-accounting background and was less drawn to the 
technical rationale of EVA®, as well as its value as an evaluation tool. To this extent, 
we theorize him as an individual possessing low accounting centricity. His relative 
lack of enthusiasm for EVA® affected EVA®’s receptivity by managers within SOE 2 
subsidiaries, who acted in consonance with their CEO. The complexity of EVA® 
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coupled with the CEO’s non-accounting background adversely influenced SOE 2 
executive engagement with the potential of EVA®: 
 
… our boss mentioned that EVA® is a concept hard to understand. And even an 
accountant would find the calculation very confusing. We were having trouble 
making sense of the concept. (Interviewee 15) 
 
The skepticism surrounding SOE 2 relative to SOE 1 was linked to the SOE 2 
CEO’s attitude to EVA®. Where SOE 1 “acquiesced” or engaged in “compromising 
strategies”, SOE 2 adopted a marginally more negative tone, but for reasons relating 
to the preservation of its core objective. For this reason, we argue that SOE 2’s 
response conceptually represented a combination of compromise and defiance. The 
style of defiance was not a form that involved challenging or attacking EVA®, but 
rather to dismiss the authentic way for calculating EVA® in place of a more diluted 
form that shielded poorly performing units bearing strategic importance. SOE 2 
adhered to the method, but did so opportunistically. 
Over time, managers accepted the approach of the EVA® system and regarded the 
5.5% return threshold as an acceptable target reflective of desired profitability that 
would reduce managers’ tendencies to over-invest. But managers remained critical of 
the use of the EVA® metric as a sole indicator. This was because many of their 
primary investments showed low returns while their non-core businesses showed high 
returns: 
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… it [EVA®] does have much effect in tempering the impulse to overinvest say in 
standardized core businesses... But it is not necessary for EVA® to be high on non-
core businesses… (Interviewee 16) 
 
The separation of roles between individuals submitting projects for acceptance and 
individuals being held responsible for those projects post-operationalization created 
tensions. These demarcations allowed for explanations for SOE 2 under-performance 
regarding EVA® when communicating with SASAC, serving as a “compromise” 
response. 
 Incentive problems between those tendering for projects and those responsible for 
the delivery of the project post tender ensued. This weakened EVA®’s rationale as 
“… the person who undertakes the project may argue that the targets could not be 
met because the estimates in the report were off” (Interviewee 12). 
 
The existence of competing strategic objectives was of particular concern in SOE 2, 
where managers questioned the value of EVA® over other measures in its ability to 
present a narrative about their performance. Specifically citing energy conservation 
projects with return spans that are not measurable, and not significant in the short run, 
SOE 2 managers control this by “excluding” factors/investments that are not 
comparable to their own situation. 
 
These discretionary accounting centric strategic actions mobilized by managers 
were tied to the manipulation of EVA®, weakening any intended effects on the actual 
practices in SOE 2. Here, we note the “defiance” of EVA® in the way it was managed 
internally, versus its communication externally. By excluding factors unfavorable to 
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them, managers within SOE 2 engaged in the practice of EVA® reporting to appease 
SASAC and the broader public, but opportunistically modified EVA® in a way that 
shields their low performing operations. Therefore, EVA® as it should be applied was 
dismissed.  Importantly, these manipulations were adopted in order to maintain the 
integrity of the core objectives of SOE 2 management, who considered energy 
efficiency as a key focus of and impossible to reconcile with an EVA® methodology. 
Such manipulations persisted notwithstanding SASAC’s attempts to be flexible in the 
evaluation of SOE 2. 
Given the asset weighting in favor of costlier heavy asset projects in SOE 2, the 
resulting weighted average effect on SOE 2’s group EVA® was negative. This 
functionally drove an intention to be more dismissive of the EVA® methodology:  
 
The EVA® of light-asset projects is better. The EVA® of heavy-asset projects is 
difficult to be raised. We are doing energy saving and environment protection 
projects, whose yield is very low. (Interviewee 16) 
 
SOE 2 executives responded to this by reminding employees to weigh in the 
broader strategic goals over immediate financial goals, notwithstanding EVA®’s focus 
on annual value creation. The strategic financial objective pursued by SASAC 
resulted in difficulties for managers making strategic choices around asset allocations 
and investments. Strategic assets that have short term losses or low returns but are 
essential in the long run for the SOEs to progress appeared as negative EVA® items. 
This caused the chief executive of SOE 2 to remind employees of the need to go 
beyond the EVA® indicator and think more holistically about SOE 2’s strategic 
choices:  
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Our CEO once said that “we should pay attention to the indicator but we must not 
neglect other things which matter”. (Interviewee 17)  
 
In order to facilitate a more concerted implementation of EVA® within its 
subsidiary ranks, SOE 2 managers rolled out training activities and integrated the 
accounting technology into its junior managerial incentive system: 
 
I think training definitely helps. We have organized many training sessions 
company-wide to make sure that both accounting and non-accounting managers 
could understand the concept of EVA®…. Moreover, EVA® is incorporated in our 
evaluation system. (Interviewee 14) 
 
SOE 2 additionally adopted an information dissemination strategy within its 
subsidiaries, engaging in an awards based program that highlighted and 
communicated the best practices of its high performing EVA® subsidiaries: 
 
Another mechanism I could think of is the award system. We have selected some 
subsidiaries which performed very well in EVA® evaluation and promote their best 
practices as the model that other subsidiaries should follow. (Interviewee 14) 
     
Emphasizing flexibility and broader thinking to incorporate other strategic pursuits 
at SOE 2 is undertaken with an acceptance that their EVA® targets could falter, which 
caused some management consternation: 
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We are trembling every year. For example, some companies use 8% [cost of 
capital] and have a high EVA® but low net operating profit, other companies use 3% 
[cost of capital] and have a negative EVA®, so we are unable to guarantee the 
achievement of Group’s EVA® target. (Interviewee 16) 
 
Notwithstanding this, SOE 2 executives retained their focus on the strategic 
positioning of critical energy related investments via the EVA® metric: 
 
We must ensure that we can meet the EVA® target set for us by SASAC. In order to 
properly implement EVA® evaluation, we should apply different rates of cost of 
capital for different subsidiaries given the characteristics of their operations.  
(Interviewee 16) 
 
Similar to SOE 1, SOE 2 managers indicated that since 2013, SASAC had 
maintained its focus on EVA® adherence but willingly softened its stance in 
negotiating EVA® targets owing to the declining macroeconomic performance in 
China: 
 
I think there are mainly two changes to the way in which EVA® is used by SASAC. 
For example, the full amount of non-operating profit could be included in the 
calculation of EVA® if we bargain with SASAC. (Interviewee 14) 
 
This evidenced SASAC’s willingness to engage in compromise with SOE 2, to 
facilitate its generation of relevant activities that may not necessarily align to the 
annualized return expectations characterized by an EVA® metric. Whilst 
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macroeconomic conditions worsened, SOE 2 had not cut staff or lowered staff salaries, 
though senior management had absorbed reductions in their salaries as mandated by 
Chinese government policy: 
 
Well, there are some deductions in the salaries of our executives’ as part of the 
anti-graft campaign of the central government but there hasn’t been any change to 
the compensation of our employees other than our executives. There are no 
influences on our EVA® evaluation … we have no pressure for staff reduction. 
(Interviewee 14) 
 
Overall, SOE 2 accepted the EVA® process and used it in its control assessments.  
However, SOE 2 executives discretionarily engaged in key strategic actions to ignore 
the low returns and risked negative EVA® returns in favor of the acquisition and 
maintenance of key long term strategic assets invested in critical areas such as energy 
investments. In this manner, SOE 2 was dismissive of the EVA® metric indicator, but 
did so to seek balance in the expectations of its different operating arms, whilst 
negotiating and appeasing SASAC at the end of period evaluation process. In this 
sense, SOE 2 appeared to display attributed of both the “Compromising Strategy” and 
“Defiance” strategic responses.  We also acknowledge its “defiance” as not rooted in 
the stronger “challenge” or “attack” descriptors per Klenk (2015), but the softer 
“dismissive” descriptor. The lack of genuine enforcement by SASAC contributed to 
the presence of a compromising strategy as well as a minor exhibition of “defiance”, 
notwithstanding the highly political and strategically important factors driving the 
EVA® implementation.  It is also noteworthy that the training initiatives and 
information systems deployment at the junior managerial ranks within SOE 2 to 
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improve EVA® acceptance did not lead to an “acquiescence” response. This further 
reinforces the importance of the purposive actions of senior executives (CEO’s) in 
shaping the nature of EVA adherence within SOE 2, over more structural factors 
driving outcomes (such as the high politicization setting and EVA® importance to 
SASAC, the oversight body). 
The manner by which SOE 2 adjusted the numbers and negotiated their position 
with SASAC thus reflected a blended Compromise/Defiance response but their 
overall focus remained aligned to EVA® as evidenced by their willingness to view 
EVA® positively, unlike the Defiance response. The lack of accounting knowledge 
(low accounting centricity) by SOE 2 made EVA® a more difficult concept for the 
CEO of SOE 2 to accept, but his deployment of operating indicators other than  
EVA® was conducted with a broader intent to protect the strategic assets of certain 
arms of his SOE.  Of particular interest is the departure from the conceptual model we 
use. We note that ”compromise” and “defiance”, even when conducted for the benefit 
of SOE 2, was done in a manner that attempted the boost the capability of SOE 2 – 
this included the provision of training and education by SASAC representatives to 
SOE 2 staff. Much of these approaches aligned to the preferences of the SOE 2 CEO, 
who was an “old-fashioned” manager uncomfortable with newer accounting 
techniques, but familiar with the operating tenets necessary to manage a task, and thus 
reflected his expertise through this medium (Andon, et al, 2014).  In this sense, the 
SOE 2 CEO’s institutional potential was considered as moderate.  Though not “high” 
as noted for the SOE 1 CEO, the SOE 2 CEO was still respected and regarded as 
having a measure of experience, consistent with his maturity and age.  SOE 2 EVA® 
adjustments were conducted with an intention to engage in adjustments that effect 
“balance” in managing the interests of different constituents and to “pacify” key 
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stakeholders, negotiating concessions that otherwise would not have been 
implemented within SOE 2.   
We also affirm that the compromise/defiance blended response was charted in 
Klenk (2015) as associated to a low intensity of formal accountability (see Table 1).  
We observed the same two responses being deployed by SOE 2 in a high formal 
accountability climate, where the public are increasingly pressuring governments to 
raise SOE efficiency. Again, this departure from Klenk (2015), as also noted for the 
SOE 1 setting, can be attributed to the purposive actions of CEO’s as motivated by 
the institutional work theoretical perspective.  Our findings depart from Du, et al 
(2012) in emphasizing how accounting methods deploy in high formal accountability 
contexts, characterized by low enforcement but high politicization.  The purposive 
actions of the SOE 2 CEO and his associated team reveal how their purposive actions 
clearly drive a more mixed response to EVA® relative to the SOE 1 CEO.  
Similar to SOE 1, SOE 2 acknowledged the softening stance of SASAC since 2013 
owing to the more adverse state of the economy, undertook training and development 
practices within its subsidiaries to promote an understanding of EVA®, implementing 
EVA® as part of its employee incentive plan in order to extend the operationalization 
of EVA® into its subsidiaries. Unlike SOE 1 management, SOE 2 was prepared to 
adjust the consideration of factors for evaluating investments in a manner that favored 
the reporting of these numbers outside their negotiating process with SASAC. To this 
extent, the quality of reporting and behaviors surrounding the implementation of the 
value strategy and consequent EVA® control was biased in order to facilitate the 
maintenance of strategic investments with low short run EVA® yields. The positive 
and mixed blended strategic responses of SOE 1 and SOE 2 respectively are 
contrasted by the adverse defiant response of SOE 3 discussed below.   
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4.2 Negative response - Defiance (SOE 3) 
While the previous two responses as characterized within Section 4.1 for SOE 1 
and SOE 2 represented “blended” responses, we find the SOE 3 response is 
substantively different in that it represents a single category (Defiance). 
Notwithstanding the absence of a blended response, SOE 3 presents an important 
theoretical advancement of Klenk (2015) in that we clarify that the absence of 
enforcement impacts greater than the presence of politicization, when CEO political 
interests are less aligned to the implementation of concern (EVA®). In this sense, the 
arguments of Moore (2014) in relation to enforcement appear to take precedence over 
the notions of politicization espoused in Perkmann and Spicer (2008). We proceed to 
elaborate this via our empirics below. 
 
SOE 3 is a conglomerate with subsidiaries operating across various sectors 
including telecommunication, information technology, broadcasting and alternative 
energy industries. SOE 3 is also the smallest of the three SOEs we investigate. In SOE 
3, EVA® was not favored as a means of performance evaluation within the 
subsidiaries. There was little evidence of a strong commitment by managers in 
subsidiaries toward value based growth via the EVA® metric, and active evidence of 
their intention to “game” the system. The attitude of the CEO of SOE 3 was also 
strongly adverse to the implementation of a new approach with senior managers being 
dismissive of EVA® metrics usage, though they acknowledged that there was broad 
generic logic to the EVA®  ideal. Much of the resistance arose from the openly hostile 
view of SOE 3’s CEO towards EVA®. The Vice Manager of the Finance Department 
at SOE 3 noted:  
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Our boss doesn't like it – it is one of the reasons why we are not using it. …he 
thinks it is too complicated to understand. (Interviewee 21) 
 
SOE 3 managers commented that such militant resistance stemmed from SOE 3’s 
CEO not having prior experience as a chief executive, or in working in a larger SOE, 
as well as his narrow base of accounting knowledge or management qualification 
which to him rendered the accounting technology particularly complex in and of itself 
rather than in terms of appropriateness for the enterprise as was the case with the CEO 
of SOE 2.  SOE 3’s Chief Executive saw shortcomings in the EVA® system and 
exhibited skepticism:  
 
Subsidiaries believe that they do quite well without EVA®, so why are they forced 
to use this indicator which is quite confusing? (Interviewee 24) 
 
The Vice Manager of the Finance Department in the headquarters of SOE 3 linked 
the CEOs background to his dislike of EVA® and their non-use of it: 
 
He has no prior experience as a CEO of a large organization. So he probably finds 
it difficult to understand the calculation and meaning of EVA®. He has said it 
many times that EVA® is very confusing concept and it is very difficult to link 
EVA® to the type of activities that we need to incentivize. In other words, it is hard 
to use EVA® as a performance measure. (Interviewee 21)   
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The SOE 3 CEO’s closeness to retirement was also a significant issue.  He did not 
wish to cause difficulties within his different divisional arms at a time critical in his 
career, evidencing little future value to the broader political hierarchy, and equally, 
with no loss that could result from manifesting resistance. As explained by 
Interviewee 21: 
 
…our CEO is very close to retirement. He wouldn’t want to risk the resistance 
(internally) and undertake some serious reform [EVA®]. Stability is what he needs 
most before he can retire smoothly. He wouldn’t want some big change so close at 
the end of his tenure. (Interviewee 21) 
 
The CEO’s inability to understand EVA® alongside the juncture he was in 
personally in his career trajectory led to a high degree of flexibility granted by the 
CEO to SOE3 managers, in the reporting of EVA® numbers.  We identify his weak 
accounting knowledge as evidence of his low accounting centricity.  Politically, his 
being close to retirement led to a lack of interest and enthusiasm for his role, leading 
to weaker governance of his operations.  Consequently, the CEO possessed low 
institutional influence.  The combination of both drivers of institutional work being 
low led to frequent instances of financial number gaming, such as the willful non-
disclosure of information to SASAC by SOE 3 executives. This  aligned to a strong 
form of “Defiance”  where SOE 3 not only dismissed EVA®  (per SOE 2), but also 
actively challenged and critiqued the EVA®  practice, ridiculing it.  Notwithstanding 
its political importance, the lack of enforcement appeared to provide SOE 3 
management no rationale to adhere to the demands of SASAC.  This was 
compounded by the absence of any political alignment by the SOE 3 CEO to SASAC 
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or the broader China government structure.  Being close to retirement, the CEO 
resented fundamental change, had no political inclinations to advance and was 
arguably not considered for promotion owing to his age and that he was close to 
retirement.  This combination of factors, in the absence of any strong enforcement 
from SASAC, emboldened the CEO and his managers to defy SASAC in a quite 
hostile manner.   
 
Of note is that managers openly admitted manipulation of numbers in the low 
enforcement environment characterized by information asymmetry. A manager 
explained how specific expenditures such as R&D might be adjusted in order to 
maintain operating margins, even adopting a taunting tone to the ability of SASAC to 
openly prove the existence of manipulation.  
 
If you are an outsider, how are you able to prove the number of expenditure on 
R&D is off? So, there is a lot of room for manipulation here. (Interviewee 24) 
 
Interestingly, SOE 3 managers did not perceive SASAC as having softened their 
stance on EVA® in their negotiations and evaluations with SOE 3, owing to the 
worsening macroeconomic conditions in China – this directly countered managerial 
comments witnessed in SOE 1 and SOE 2. This lack of compromise from SASAC 
was seen as a signal by SOE 3 managers to bunker down, cementing their hostility to 
the method in order to preserve the stability of their own operations.  SOE 3 managers 
reflected that it was reasonable for SASAC to keep to its uncompromising stance to 
maintain its authority: 
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I don’t think there has been much change in the use of EVA® by SASAC. Although 
the economy is slowing down, I don’t see any changes in SASAC’s regulation. The 
emphasis on EVA® is even stronger. There might be some flexibility given the 
economic downturn. But I would say from the point of fairness, SASAC might relax 
its regulations only in some extreme cases. Otherwise, how could it keep its 
authority? (Interviewee 22) 
  
Again, this was counter to SOE 1 and SOE 2 managerial comments, which had 
instead emphasised the importance of SASAC being flexible and to assist SOE’s to 
meet their EVA® targets in order maintain its own place as an over-arching, 
governing body of SOE’s. The “Acquiescence” and “Compromise” evidenced by 
SOE 1 and SOE 2 appeared to be reciprocated by SASAC, but no such posturing was 
evidenced from SASAC to SOE 3.   
In adopting neo-institutional arguments regarding strategic responses we note that 
the defiance strategic response drives a more lucid, somewhat harsher and 
increasingly negative version of defiance relative to SOE 2, that leads to overtly 
disruptive institutional actions (in its effect on EVA®) within SOE 3. What was 
theoretically surprising was that the level of politicization surrounding EVA® was 
high, while enforcement was low (Horizontal Axis, Table 1).  Neo-institutionalists 
assume both to align, and indeed construct both within the same axis.  Theoretically, 
we advance that the absence of enforcement appears to play a stronger role than the 
presence of politicization, when CEO political interests are not aligned as observed 
through the militancy of SOE 3 as driven down by the SOE 3 CEO resistance to EVA. 
When an accounting innovation is politically of high importance, the absence of a 
proper enforcement regime renders this politicization impotent, but only if the 
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political work of a CEO is aligned against the organization (Wu et al. 2012). No 
enforcement presents a motivation to contest, challenge and attack the system (as was 
the case with SOE 3).  However,   when politicization is high and enforcement low on 
an SOE where the political work of the CEO strongly aligns to the source of the 
political pressure (as observed for SOE 1), the strategic response of the organization 
is one strongly in favor of politicization (supporting Lei et al. 2013; and Tu et al. 2013; 
Perkmann and Spicer, 2008), notwithstanding low enforcement.  The SOE 1 CEO 
openly cooperated and acquiesced or adopted a strategic compromise stance in order 
to be seen as a future leader within the broader Chinese political system.   
Whilst  neo-institutionalists (Greenwood and Suddaby 2006; Klenk 2015; 
Lawrence and Suddaby 2006; Oliver 1991; Seo and Creed 2002; Suddaby 2010; 
Zietsma and Lawrence 2010) propose a valuable entrée reflective of responses which 
engender organizational conformity as well as resistance to institutional processes, we 
have argued here that the typology’s separate dimensions of strategic responses 
requires coupling, hybridization and interface to more effectively cohere to the 
observed practices in our empirical context. We not only reinforce the claims 
surrounding the maintenance of institutions (the EVA® implementation process) 
through the actions conducted by SASAC officers, but also illustrate the purposive 
efforts to maintain and disrupt the same from a multiplicity of SOEs. From this 
perspective, we have noted variation in the strategic responses and their links to the 
nature of neo-institutional work in accounting (maintaining versus disrupting 
institutions) from an aligned but complementary view encompassing a wider base of 
stakeholders.    
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Differences in the impacts of EVA® in subsidiaries of the three SOEs are 
summarized in Table 5. As previously explained, the highly aligned political work 
towards EVA® by SOE 1’s CEO can be explained by his Ivy League education 
driving an appreciation of modern accounting analyses (accounting centricity), and 
rapid rise up the regulatory ranks in China (institutional potential).  The SOE 2 CEO 
exhibits moderate institutional potential and is appreciative of accounting 
methodologies, but with less enthusiasm than the SOE 1 CEO, thus driving his 
moderate acceptance of  EVA® in a mixed manner.  The SOE 3 CEO exhibited low 
accounting centricity and institutional potential, which led to the CEO’s forceful 
rejection of EVA®.  Our findings speak to the importance of these two individual 
level factors (institutional potential and accounting centricity) in impacting the 
institutional responses of SOEs to an accounting innovation. 
 
[Insert Table 5 here] 
 
The Klenk (2015) accountability framework as depicted in Table 1 is plausibly 
modified as a consequence of our empirics. We reveal the impact of institutional work 
as evidenced through the actions of hypermuscular (Perkmann and Spicer, 2008) 
actors (CEO’s) in affecting how we predict responses to accountability claims, in 
Table 6.   This variation in the institutional work of CEO’s appears contingent on the 
extent to which SOE CEO’s possess a knowledge and willingness to deploy 
accounting concepts such as EVA® (accounting centricity), as well as the importance 
with which each is regarded by the broader political structure in the government 
apparatus (institutional potential).  As revealed in Table 6 below, higher levels of one 
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or both generally led to more authentic responses to accountability claims by the 
respective SOE.  
 
 [Insert Table 6 here] 
 
Our study of how the embedding of a centrally mandated managerial accounting 
technology exhibits differentiated local strategic responses, enables us to add to what 
is known about the centrality of organizational actors’ agency in the structuring of an 
institutional process (Holm 1995; Greenwood and Suddaby 2006; Oliver 1991; Seo 
and Creed 2002; Zietsma and Lawrence 2010). In doing so, we add to the literature in 
our investigation of organizational responses to external public accountability claims, 
when politicization and enforcement (or lack of) are implicated.   However, we go 
further, advancing hybridized responses subsumed from neo-institutional arguments 
in relation to the alignment between politicization and enforcement (advancing Klenk 
(2015)), identifying inverse combinations of politicization and enforcement, and 
explaining how the hybridized (blended) responses as driven by institutional work 
explanations raise our understanding of the subtle relationships underlying different 
responses to accountability.  These serve to directly address calls for more research in 
this space (Suddaby, 2010; Lawrence, et al , 2011) 
6. Conclusions 
We investigate the responses of Chinese state-owned enterprises (SOEs) following 
a governmental ordinance to use Economic Value Added (EVA®). We add to the 
literature in that, first, we identify blended responses to institutional pressures, 
building on and advancing the ideas of prior neo-institutionalists interested in 
accounting regulation institutionalisation. We explain how blended responses (for 
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SOE 1 and SOE 2) are directly attributable to the institutional/political work of key 
actors, bridging Klenk (2015) and Lawrence and Suddaby (2006), and mobilise the 
accounting centricity and institutional potential of hypermuscular actors as driving 
factors influencing the authenticity of institutional responses to public accountability 
claims, even in the absence of enforcement.  
Second, we reveal that even in a high public accountability context characterised 
by politicization, “politicization” and “enforcement” need not align. When 
politicization is high and enforcement is low, as characterised in our institutional 
setting, the political work of CEO’s greatly influence the style of strategic response 
adopted by SOE’s.  When a CEO’s political work aligns with the external hierarchy 
characterising the politicization (SOE 1), the absence of enforcement does not 
substantively influence the emphasis placed by the SOE to ingratiate the demands of 
external authorities.  However, when the CEO political work contests the external 
hierarchy (SOE 3), we find that the absence of enforcement dominates, and the level 
of external ingratiation is low.  High politicisation has little effect on this low level of 
ingratiation.  Our findings lend support to the notion that powerful individuals within 
organizations manifest personal preferences and/or personality states that 
fundamentally impact the design and use of management accounting systems.  While 
this idea has been rudimentarily investigated in relation to its negative ramifications 
(Young, et al, 2016) – the simultaneous consideration of both positive and negative 
with a theoretical argument for their departure has not been put forward in studies to 
date.  In this sense, our findings also clarify and advance Lei et al. (2013) in more 
clearly explaining how the political work of key individuals in SOE’s shape their 
responses to public accountability calls, and that their influence does not always 
manifest in deleterious consequences from an accountability perspective.  
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Finally, tied to our appeal to neo-institutional theory, we offer a stronger 
explication of how accounting is implicated in maintaining and disrupting 
institutional processes (Perkmann and Spicer 2008; Lawrence and Suddaby 2006), 
while clarifying divergence in the styles of this maintenance and disruption (Suddaby 
2010). Our findings also further existing knowledge regarding how institutional work 
advances accounting innovations (furthering Hayne and Free, 2014).  
Studies in differing contexts which seek to clarify how different hybridized 
versions of strategic responses to those we investigated will help shed further light on 
the manner by which firms might more subtly tackle institutional accounting 
requirements. Our findings mainly focus on the maintenance and disruption of 
institutional practices linked to SASAC’s roll out of EVA®. Future studies on other 
accounting technologies will add to our understanding of the durability of these 
theorizations, and their applicability across a range of regulated accounting practices. 
Our study focused on SOE CEOs as the key strategic individuals driving 
leadership in the SOEs.  We contend that the respondents of all three SOEs identified 
the CEO as the most important operating executive in their respective SOEs.   
Nevertheless, to the extent that other senior officers such as the Chairman and CFO 
also occupy significant positions of power and influence in SOEs, our findings might 
be regarded as not fully capturing the perspective of key actors. Scope exists for 
future research to use a broader base of actors in addressing the issues explored. 
We reported a behavioral alignment between the actions and intentions of SOE 
CEO’s and SOE managers, whereby other SOE CEOs might find it harder to motivate 
their senior management group, especially if their behaviors do not align to SASAC 
aspirations. Future studies that unpick these attributes and incorporate such deviations 
into the China EVA® setting might identify relationships currently not observed in 
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this emerging literature, and further clarify or advance the divergences observed in 
our findings 
We acknowledge that other reasons beyond the political work of key actors might 
play a role in driving the manner of strategic responses to EVA® process 
implementations, though our data revealed these as less important.  We take heed that 
the flexibility of SASAC, the strategic importance of SOEs in performing a public 
service, and the broader pressures affecting SOEs in China from a public perception 
standpoint are factors driving the strategic responses in our findings, though our three 
SOEs studied did not experience a loss of jobs or salary cuts to their non-executive 
staff owing to deteriorating economic conditions in China. Finally, we note that the 
assumption of human agency within an institutional theory setting has been argued as 
problematic in a minority of old-institutional aligned studies. We adhere to the more 
pragmatic concerns of core neo-institutional work theorists who seek to over-
archingly understand the manner by which key actors affect responses to accounting 
regulation through their action.   
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Table 1: Klenk (2015) Accountability claims and organizational responses 
 
 
 Enforcement and Politicization 
Low High 
Intensity of formal 
accountability 
claims 
High Compartmentalizing, 
(Decoupling) 
Acquiescence 
Low Defiance Pacification, Balancing, 
Compromising 
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11 SASAC’s growth objectives and the means by which Chinese SOEs achieved success met with criticism (Chen et al. 2011; Firth et al. 2013). SOEs were regarded as producing a relatively 
small share of output and value added relative to the private sector but consuming a large proportion of capital, raw materials and intermediate inputs. SOEs had also been considered to have 
benefitted from preferential access to bank finance and business opportunities, and of being protected against competition placing private competitors at a disadvantage (the World Bank 2012; 
Fan et al. 2013) SASAC voiced its reaction to the criticisms levelled at the scale growth strategy in the 11th Five-Year Plan (2006-2010) by articulating a new strategy for SOEs in the 12th Five-
Year Plan (2011-2015). The objective for SOEs under the latest plan was to “pursue excellence” and to “reinforce value creation” and “force managers to think on behalf of the shareholders”, 
rather than a mission to “become bigger”. (SASAC, Annual Review of Central SOE Performance, 2010). 
12 In 2003, the total assets owned by central SOE’s totaled 8 trillion (RMB) ($1.3 trillion USD). By the end of 2010, the total assets owned by central SOEs amounted to 24.4 trillion RMB. 
Table 2: Development of EVA® in SOE’s 
 
Main 
Performance 
Measures 
 
Consideration of  
EVA® 
Mission/Strategy 
set out in the 
National Five-
year Plans 
Financial Effect Reaction 
 
 
 
2004- 
2010 
Financial: 
 Annual Profit 
 Return on Net 
Assets 
(Equity) 
 
Non-financial: 
 Industry 
specific 
measures 
 
2004: SASAC pilot 
EVA® 
implementation – ten 
SOE’s 
 
2007- onwards: 
SASAC 
implemented roll-out 
of EVA® in all 
SOEs, but used for 
evaluation only in 
some SOE’s.  
 
Late 2009: Nearly a 
hundred central 
SOEs participated in 
pilot evaluation of 
EVA®. 
Becoming bigger 
and stronger 11  - 
scale oriented 
growth 
 
The scale-oriented strategy was 
effectively pursued. Over the period 
2003-2010, the total assets of 
central SOEs more than 
tripled 12 .The number of central 
SOEs listed in the Fortune 500 
increased from 6 in 2003 to more 
than 30 in 2010. 
 
SOE comprise 70 percent of the 
profits of over 120,000 SOEs 
equivalent to 20 percent of 
government revenues. Listed 
subsidiaries of central SOEs 
account for a third of the market 
capitalization value of Chinese 
domestic stock exchanges in 2010. 
 
SASAC’s growth objectives and 
the means by which Chinese 
SOEs achieved success met with 
criticism (Chen et al. 2011; Firth 
et al. 2013). SOEs were regarded 
as producing a relatively small 
share of output and value added 
relative to the private sector but 
consuming a large proportion of 
capital, raw materials and 
intermediate inputs. SOEs 
considered to have benefitted 
from preferential access to bank 
finance and business 
opportunities, and of being 
protected against competition 
placing private competitors at a 
disadvantage (the World Bank 
2012; Fan et al. 2013) 
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13 SASAC website: http://www.sasac.gov.cn/n1180/n14200459/n14417163/index.html. 
 
 
2010- 
 Present 
Financial: 
 Annual Profit 
 EVA® 
 
Non-financial: 
 Industry 
specific 
measures 
 
Complete EVA® 
rollout, including 
performance 
evaluation, in SOE’s.  
“An essential step in 
the great leap 
forward”.13 
Pursing 
excellence and 
intensification of 
economic impact. 
 
Value oriented 
growth 
 
At the end of 2015, the total assets 
owned by central SOEs amounted 
to 53.7 trillion RMB ($8.4 trillion 
US) with operating revenues of 28 
trillion RMB ($4.4 trillion US) and 
annual earnings of 1.7 trillion RMB 
($267 billion US). 
The number of central SOEs listed 
in the Fortune 500 is increased to 
47 in 2015. 
 
SASAC voiced its reaction to 
the criticisms levelled at the 
scale growth strategy in the 11th 
Five-Year Plan (2006-2010) by 
articulating a new strategy for 
SOEs in the 12th Five-Year Plan 
(2011-2015). The objective for 
SOEs under the latest plan was 
to “pursue excellence” and to 
“reinforce value creation” and 
“force managers to think on 
behalf of the shareholders”, 
rather than a mission to “become 
bigger”. (SASAC, Annual 
Review of Central SOE 
Performance, 2010). 
 
59 
 
Table 3 EVA® Measures used by SASAC (2010-2012) 
 
EVA®  = net operating profit (after tax) - adjusted capital X cost of capital 
Net operating profit 
(after tax) 
net profit + (interest payment + R&D expense - non-recurrent income X 
50%) (1-25%) 
 
 Adjusted capital owners' equity + total liability - interest-free current liability - 
construction in progress (in defined core businesses) 
Cost of capital 5.5% in principle 
4.1% for those with heavy state/social responsibility and high-level 
assets specificity 
6.0% for those with liability/assets ratio above 75% 
 
Table 4 Performance measurement system used by SASAC (2010-2012) 
 
Total scores = (EVA® scores + Profit scores + industry specific measures scores) x operating difficulty 
ratio +/- other awarded or deducted scores 
EVA®: 
basic scores 40, 
achieved scores vary 
between 40+/-8 
 
•The benchmark for target setting: the lower of the previous year's achieved 
EVA® and the average of last three year’s achieved EVA®  
 
•Two scenarios for scoring based on the variance between actual and target 
EVA® according to whether the annual EVA® target is above or below the 
benchmark: 
S1, if the EVA® target is above the bench mark  
•starting from score of 40 
•for every 2% of positive variance, award one extra score, maximum 8 extra 
scores 
•for every 3% negative variance, minus one score, maximum minus 8 scores 
S2, the EVA® target is below the bench mark 
•starting from score of 40 
•for every 3% of positive variance, award one extra score, maximum 8 extra 
scores 
•for every 3% negative variance, minus one score, maximum minus 8 scores 
Profit: Basic score 30; achieved scores vary between 30+/- 8; similar method as above 
Industry specific measures: two measures, basic scores 30; achieved scores vary  
between 30 +/- 6 
Operating difficulty ratio: based on the weighted average of total assets, sales, total profit, return on net 
assets, employees, and EVA®  
Other awarded or deducted scores: 
Outstanding contribution to state-required projects, add 0.5-2 scores  
Any frauds, deduct 0.5-2 scores depending on the degree of severe  
Not well established MCS in the firm, deduct 0.1-1 score 
If the gap between achieved profit and profit target exceeds 50%, deduct 0.5-2 score 
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Table 5 Different effects on firm-level strategic decisions 
 
 SOE1 (Acquiescence) SOE2 (Compromising 
Strategies/Defiance) 
SOE3 (Defiance) 
Political Work 
determinants 
CEO – Ivy League 
educated, incentive to 
adopt Western 
management practices 
(O’Connor et al. 2004). 
 
CEO – Political 
posturing: acquiescence 
to enhance future slated 
career in government. 
 
Managers – China power 
distance: Obedience & 
respect for CEO. 
CEO – Previously CEO 
of a smaller SOE.   
 
CEO - No accounting 
background. 
 
Managers: China power-
distance - Obedience to 
apathetic CEO translates 
to flexibility in EVA® 
design practices. 
CEO – Never previously 
CEO. 
 
CEO close to retirement 
age, sees little value in 
supporting or detracting 
from control 
implementations for 
personal appraisal 
reasons. 
 
CEO lack of accounting 
background. 
 
Managers – China power 
distance: Impact of 
SASAC.   
EVA® evaluation 
of the group by 
SASAC: cost of 
capital and grades 
awarded14 
SOE1 is evaluated based 
on a 5.5% cost of capital 
and awarded “A” in the 
evaluation. 
SOE2 is evaluated based 
on a 5.5% cost of capital 
and awarded “B” in the 
evaluation. 
SOE3 is evaluated based 
on a 5.5% cost of capital 
and awarded “B” in the 
evaluation. 
EVA® evaluation 
of subsidiaries by 
the headquarters 
EVA® is used in all 
subsidiaries and business 
units. EVA® is calculated 
based on a 9% of cost of 
equity and actual interest 
rate on debt.  
EVA® is used in the 
first-tier subsidiaries and 
calculated by the 
headquarters based on a 
cost of capital of 5.5%. 
EVA® is not used in 
subsidiaries. It is 
considered a noisy 
factor. 
Effects of the 
change in MCS on 
investment 
decisions of 
subsidiaries of 
central SOEs 
Strong acceptance:  
 
EVA® is an important 
measure in project 
appraisal. Ongoing 
projects are monitored to 
compare the actual 
EVA® with targeted 
EVA®.  
 
EVA® has encouraged 
investments in R&D. 
Weak acceptance: 
 
EVA® is used in 
investment appraisals 
but once the projects are 
approved, whether the 
proposed target EVA® is 
achieved is not 
monitored. 
 
EVA® has no substantial 
influence in R&D 
investments as SOE2 
which operates in 
Weak acceptance: 
 
There is a hurdle rate of 
return of 5.5% in 
investment appraisal but 
the outcomes are not 
monitored. The use of 
EVA® in investment 
appraisal is mainly 
symbolic. 
                                                        
14 The performance of the Central SOEs and their top managers is assessed annually based on total achieved scores 
according the performance assessment system. The SOEs are accordingly classified into five categories, A, B, C, D 
and E respectively. Executive salaries, bonuses, and career development are significantly affected by the categories 
and the scores achieved. 
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technology industry has 
always a high R&D 
spending. 
Effects of the 
change in MCS on 
financing 
decisions of 
subsidiaries of 
central SOEs 
Strong acceptance: 
 
EVA® is an important 
measure in evaluating 
the performance of 
subsidiaries. EVA® has 
encouraged subsidiaries 
to use debt financing 
rather than equity 
financing15.   
Weak acceptance: 
 
The headquarters does 
not charge a different 
rate of return for capital 
invested in subsidiaries 
compared with capital 
obtained from debt 
financing. Hence EVA® 
has no influence on 
subsidiaries’ financing 
decisions. 
Weak acceptance: 
 
EVA® is not 
implemented in 
subsidiaries. Hence it 
has no significant 
influence on financing 
decisions of subsidiaries. 
 
 
 
                                                        
15 The headquarters of the central SOE group is the shareholder of its subsidiaries. Equity financing implies that 
subsidiaries obtain capital from the central SOE headquarters. 
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Table 6: Advancing Klenk (2015) - Institutional work impacts on accountability responses  
 
 
 
High intensity formal accountability claims, High 
Politicization & Low Enforcement - adapted from 
Klenk (2015) 
CEO Accounting centricity 
Low High 
 
 
 
CEO Institutional  
Potential 
High  SOE 1 
Acquiescence 
Compromise 
Moderate SOE 2 
Compromise 
Defiance 
 
Low  
SOE 3 
Defiance 
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Appendix I List of interviewees and empirical data collected  
 
Target of 
investigation 
Background Source of Empirical data 
State-owned 
Assets 
Supervision 
and 
Administration 
Commission 
of the State 
Council 
（SASAC） 
SASAC was established by the 
State Council in 2003, mainly as 
an effort to create an institutional 
framework that separates the 
fiduciary responsibility for the 
state-owned assets from the 
government’s social and public 
management functions. SASAC 
at the national level handles the 
state's ownership interests as well 
as regulation and supervision of 
central SOEs. 
 Interviews: 
Three interviews were conducted with the central SASAC 
officials in the evaluation bureau who are in charge of the 
performance evaluation of central SOEs. 
1. Interviewee 1, 174 minutes 
2. Interviewee 2, 55 minutes 
3. Interviewee 3, 15 minutes  
 Documents: 
SASAC’s regulations on and guidance to the use of EVA®-
based MCS are collected and analyzed. 
Central SOE1 
Fortune 500 with an asset of over 
260 billion RMB ($41 billion US) 
and a net profit of 8 billion RMB 
($1.2 billion US) in 2011. 
 Interviews: 
Interviews were conducted with four senior managers in the 
headquarters and subsidiaries of  
1. CFO of SOE1 (interviewee 4), 60 minutes. 
2. Manager of Finance Department who is in charge of 
performance measurement system in the headquarters 
(Interviewee 5), 75 minutes. 
3. Vice Manager of Finance Department in the headquarters 
(Interviewee 6), 30 minutes, and 15 minutes (follow-up 
interview). 
4. Manager of Control Division in Finance Department in the 
headquarters (Interviewee 7), 22 minutes. 
5. Manager of Investment Department in the headquarters 
(Interviewee 8), 70 minutes. 
6. Vice Manager of the Strategic Development Department in 
the headquarters (Interviewee 9), 25 minutes. 
7. VP of Subsidiary 1 (listed in Hong Kong stock exchange) 
(Interviewee 10), 65 minutes. 
8. Senior Manager of Subsidiary 1 (Interviewee 11), 68 
minutes. 
9. Manager of the Finance Department of Subsidiary 1 
(Interviewee 12), 20 minutes. 
10. Senior Manager of Subsidiary 2 (listed in Shenzhen stock 
exchange) (Interviewee 13), 100 minutes. 
 Documents: 
1. Internal documents which dictate adoption the EVA®-
based performance measurement system. 
2. Internal document on the performance evaluation system 
of subsidiaries 
3. External information collected from media reports and 
internet  
Central SOE2 
Central SOE with an asset of over 
60 billion RMB ($9.5 billion US) 
and a net profit of 1.2 billion 
RMB ($0.25 billion US) in 2011. 
 Interviews: 
Interviews were conducted with four senior managers in the 
headquarters and one subsidiary of SOE2: 
1. Manager of Finance Department in the headquarters 
(Interviewee 14), 90 minutes, and 25 minutes (follow-up 
interview). 
2. Vice Manager of the Finance Department in the 
headquarters (Interviewee 15), 20 minutes  
3. Manager of Accounting Information Department in the 
headquarters (Interviewee 16), 75 minutes. 
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4. Manager of HR Department in the headquarters 
(Interviewee 17), 60 minutes. 
5. CFO of the subsidiary (Interviewee 18), 65 minutes. 
6. Manager of Finance Department of the subsidiary 
(Interviewee 19), 15 minutes. 
 Documents: 
1. Internal documents which dictate the use of EVA®-based 
performance measurement system. 
2. External information collected from media reports and 
internet 
Central SOE3 
Central SOE with an asset of over 
25 billion RMB ($3.95 billion 
US) and a net profit of 0.5 billion 
RMB ($79 million US) in 2011. 
 Interviews: 
Interviews were conducted with four senior managers in the 
headquarters and one subsidiary of SOE3: 
1. Manager of Finance Department in the headquarters 
(Interviewee 20), 85 minutes. 
2. Vice Manager of the Finance Department in the 
headquarters (Interviewee 21), 30 minutes. 
3. Manager of Strategy Department in the headquarters 
(Interviewee 22), 30 minutes, and 25 minutes (follow-up 
interview). 
4. Vice Manager of Strategy Department in the headquarters 
(Interviewee 23), 30 minutes. 
5. Manager of Investment Department in the headquarters 
(Interviewee 24), 90 minutes. 
6. Manager of HR Department in the headquarters 
(Interviewee 25), 90 minutes. 
7. VP of a subsidiary (Interviewee 26), 60 minutes. 
8. Vice Manager of the Finance Department at a subsidiary  
(Interviewee 27), 10 minutes  
 Documents: 
1. Internal documents which dictate the use of EVA®-based 
performance measurement system. 
2. External information collected from media reports and the 
Internet. 
